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THE ELUSIVE RECOVERY
A slowing down recovery
The economic, financial and institutional crisis which started in 2008 looks like it
is never going to end. Nearly 9 years after the meltdown of the financial system
of developed countries, after a violent recession followed by the euro debt crisis
in 2012, a recovery finally started in late 2014. It has been pushed by a mix of
fair winds, such as low oil prices, low interest rates, a lower effective exchange
rate of the euro, a less negative fiscal stance in the euro area and unconven-
tional monetary policies. Adding to those fair winds, the Juncker commission
took stock of the worrying situation in 2015 and proposed the Juncker Plan to
boost (mostly private) investment in the EU. 
Table 1. Breakdown of short term forecast for euro area
2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018
GDP growth 2.0 1.6 -0.9 -0.2 1.2 1.9 1.6 1.4 1.3
Effect of … on GDP growth
Oil 0.0 -0.3 -0.2 0.0 0.1 0.5 0.3 0.0 -0.1
Price competitiveness 0.4 0.4 0.5 0.1 -0.2 0.4 0.3 0.2 0.1
Financial conditions -0.2 0.0 -0.6 -0.4 0.1 0.0 -0.1 0.1 0.1
Fiscal policy -0.2 -1.2 -2.2 -1.2 -0.5 -0.3 0.0 0.0 -0.2
Emerging countries trade 
slowdown
0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 -0.1 -0.2 -0.1 -0.1 -0.1
Brexit 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 -0.1 0.0
Carry over 0.2 0.5 -1.1 -0.3 0.8 0.1 0.1 0.0 -0.1
Other 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 -0.1 -0.1 -0.1 0.0 0.0
Sum of above effects 0.2 -0.6 -3.6 -1.8 0.1 0.5 0.4 0.1 -0.3
Growth in the absence of effects 1.9 2.2 2.7 1.5 1.1 1.5 1.3 1.3 1.6
Potential growth 0.9 0.9 0.8 0.8 0.9 0.9 0.9 0.9 0.9
Output gap* -2.1 -1.4 -3.1 -4.1 -3.8 -2.8 -2.1 -1.5 -1.1
*Output gap is the ratio between the level of effect GDP and potential GDP and hence first difference of output
gap is equal to the difference between GDP growth and potential growth.
Source: AMECO, iAGS calculation and forecast.
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But despite all this, the recovery has been weak and the closing of the output
gap is delayed again. We expect, as we detail in chapter 1 of this report, that
economic growth is going to slow down in 2017 and in 2018 (Table 3 of
chapter 1 in this report). Tailwinds are changing into headwinds (see chapter 1
in this report and Table 1). Oil prices are up again, and seem to stabilize around
55$/b. The effective exchange rate of the euro has been stable against the
dollar (Figure 1). Not much more can be expected in terms of competitiveness
gains through this channel. The sharp depreciation of sterling after the Brexit
referendum is indeed reversing the trend and will lead to a slightly increasing
real exchange rate in the next quarters. More importantly the slowdown of
international trade and the slowing growth of emerging countries (as compared
to before the crisis) reduce the external demand growth (Table 1) of the Euro-
pean Union and hence another positive factor is waning.
This slowing and elusive recovery comes with consequences. Unemployment
has reached a high level, peaking in the second quarter of 2013 at more than
12% for the euro area and 11% for the UE28. As we document in chapter 2 of
this report, high unemployment is one face of many aspects of a profound
social crisis. After the 2013 peak, unemployment started to decrease. Figure 2 is
showing the number of years needed, given the current pace of reduction in
unemployment, to go back to the rate prevailing in 2007. The recent slowdown
Figure 1. Euro effective exchange rate, real and nominal
Source: ECB.
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is pushing this target back by 7 years. This illustrates why the recovery is elusive
and how far we are from going back to the unemployment rates prevailing
before the crisis. Combined with a forecasted further slowdown of the recovery,
it suggests that it will require a long time to end the crisis which began in 2008.
Moreover, as we show in chapter 2, the slow clearing of the labour market is
done partly through a wage adjustment, as the structural reform doctrine is
advocating, and inequalities are raising at the bottom of the income distribu-
tion. That channel is strong in some countries, like Spain, where the share of
wages in total value added has been sharply diminishing. Unemployment is
weighting down on wages, whereas it is contributing to reduce internal disequi-
librium of current accounts. However, it does so mainly by shrinking the
demand for imports of euro area countries (see chapter 4 of this report). That is
fueling “lowflation” and could end in deflation, locking the euro area in the
wage deflation and unemployment trap.
2 years ahead forecasts are not enchanting but prospects for future growth are
worrying. Potential growth is slowing down, partly due to the 2008 crisis, as
historical analysis suggests that the financial and banking crisis tend to have a
lasting impact on economies.1 Added to that, prospects for future growth in
Figure 2. Pace of unemployment reduction
Source: Eurostat, monthly unemployement data, iAGS calculation.
1. See for instance analysis by Jordà et al. (2011) and Reinhart and Rogoff (2008).
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developed countries are further reduced by population stagnation. Ageing
population and reduction in fertility rates in developed countries, as well as the
end of increases in participation rates, imply a significant slowing of the
working age population and even a decreasing one in some countries (the core
projection is that the labor force will be stable over the next few years for the
euro area according to the 2015 Ageing Report). But productivity is also a
concern. Multifactor productivity or total factor productivity (a comprehensive
measure of productivity, table 2) is growing less than before, and less than in
the US. That could be due to a mismeasurement of capital stock or of utilization
rates of factors, especially in the crisis (explaining why numbers are so low
when they include the most acute phases of the crisis). That could also be a
consequence of capital misallocation, especially in the wake of the quasi bubble
before the crisis. But it could also be a long trend in productivity, fueling the
Gordon hypothesis of a coming secular stagnation and reviving the old analysis
of the end of the dynamic of capitalism.
Table 2. Total factor productivity growth
Annual average rate of growth in %/year
1987-1997 1997-2007 2007-2016 2012-2016
USA 0.9 1.2 0.6 0.5
GBR 0.8 0.8 -0.2 0.4
EA-11 0.9 0.5 -0.1 0.3
DEU 0.8 0.8 0.2 0.5
FRA 1.0 0.8 0.1 0.4
ITA 1.1 -0.1 -0.7 0.1
ESP 0.2 -0.7 -0.3 0.1
NLD 0.3 0.7 -0.3 0.5
BEL 0.8 0.9 -0.1 0.1
AUT 0.8 1.1 -0.4 -0.2
IRL 3.0 1.5 0.6 1.6
FIN 1.3 2.0 -0.6 0.1
PRT 1.0 -1.0 -0.6 0.4
GRC 1.7 1.8 -2.5 -0.6
Source: OECD Economic Outlook 99, iAGS calculations. TFP is defined as rate of growth of GDP minus growth of 
production factors weighted with their share in GDP. Labor (not corrected for human capital) and non residential 
capital are taken into account.
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By itself, a slowing down in GDP growth should not be a disaster. As we recall in
chapter 2 of this report, GDP is a partial measure of wellbeing. It is an average
index hiding a dynamic of inequalities. It is a monetary measure, accounting for
monetary economic activity and ignoring non-market flows such as domestic
work or damages to Nature. It is because of that a crude measure of social and
environmental sustainability. So a full account of future prospects should disre-
gard the GDP index and point to other kinds of indicators.
The slowing down of GDP growth, however, means that future monetary flows
are not going to ease the weight of debts (public and private) as was the case,
for instance, after WWII. The secular stagnation hypothesis, in its Gordon funda-
mental form, would ask for further adjustment of public finance.
A policy mix unable to avoid the trap of secular 
stagnation
The euro debt crisis of 2011-2012 was temporarily solved with a decisive inter-
vention by the European Central Bank on July 2012 (the famous “whatever it
takes” from Mario Draghi). This intervention marked a turning point in the spirit
of the Union, allowing for a limited solidarity between member States. The ECB
has been the corner stone of this new doctrine (figure 3), first with the introduc-
tion of OMT and more recently with the launch of Quantitative Easing.2
Nevertheless, the explicit price for this change in doctrine has been a forced
frontloading of fiscal consolidation. Thus, fiscal policy had a strongly negative
impact from 2011 to 2013 (see table 1) and has contributed to the deepening
of the crisis. 
By giving its full expression to what was only a potential risk of a “sudden stop”,
frontloading was a mistake. Panic-driven austerity in the face of sanctions from
financial markets does not restore any sort of confidence and can only deepen
and diffuse a recession. As we argued in previous iAGS, reducing fiscal deficit at
a time of large fiscal multipliers is inefficient. A better approach would have
been to backload fiscal consolidation, given that intertemporal consistency of
governments was guaranteed. That analysis is now, belatedly, nearly a
2. By relying partly on national central banks to buy assets, especially national sovereign bonds,
the solidarity between member States is limited to 20% of total amount outstanding. This
shows, if necessary, that resolute intervention of central banks is not necessarily equal to a
transfer potential or actual between member States. 
iAGS 2017 — independent Annual Growth Survey 5th Report20
consensus among observers and one could argue that fiscal consolidation has
been a proof that member states are indeed committed to fiscal stability (what-
ever it takes for them too, so to say). Based on that costly and nearly absurd
demonstration, a more efficient approach to debt stabilization and reduction
may be applied from now.
This situation refers to another type of secular stagnation than the Gordon sort.
It is closer to the analysis of Larry Summers, building upon Hansen’s work.3
Some have formalized the idea of a multiple equilibrium economy where,
through the interaction of balance sheets, investment, productivity and expec-
tations, a fiscal stimulus could have a very strong effect on the short-term
outlook of the economy, when the economy is in a severe recession or what
was called a few years ago a liquidity trap (Krugman et al. (1998)). The IMF, in
an influential analysis, concluded that fiscal multipliers could be as high as 3 in
the short term in such situation, confirming the basic approach underpinning
successive iAGS. 
Figure 3. Index of market discipline for member states
Source: Eurostat, datastream, ECB, iAGS 2017 computations.
3. Whereas Hansen was also preoccupied by a Gordon type secular stagnation.
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The negative fiscal stance came to an end slowly in 2015 and the Juncker plan
was designed to reverse the negative impetus to the economy. The new
doctrine behind the Juncker plan was that a stimulus was needed at the euro
area level and that an investment stimulus would achieve simultaneously a
short-term macro boost to escape the secular stagnation trap and to build up
assets and achieve higher productivity levels to ensure sustainability of public
debt and pension systems in the long run. 
The Juncker plan has failed to deliver both. Its impact has been broadly positive,
but neither the needed stimulus in the short term nor the increase in potential
growth in the long term are going to happen in the current form of the plan
(see chapter 3 of this report for a detailed analysis). The reason is that, at heart,
the Juncker plan is a reduction in the interest rate that investors are facing by
insuring their investment from some specific risks. The Juncker plan is to be
understood as an extra insurance on investment projects, but not as a tool to
reverse the logic of self-fulling secular stagnation. The insurance is a rather small
reduction in the cost of capital and that reduction is not different in nature from
the already present effect of conventional and non-conventional monetary
policy. We document in chapter 3 of this report the combined effect of non-
conventional monetary policy and the Juncker plan has been so far positive but
insufficient to provide the stimulus needed. We also caution against excessive
reliance on capital markets union to support a return to balanced and stable
growth. Our analysis suggests that positive impacts should not be overstated,
while a modelling exercise draws attention to potential stability risks of secu-
ritizing loans, one of the pillars of CMU.
Euro area underperforming and the risk of the appreciation 
of the euro
Two symptoms of the insufficient overall momentum in the euro area are its
weaker performance than comparable economies and the persistence of a large
current account surplus (see Figure 4, 3.8% of EA GDP, 394 bn€ in 2015, much
more than China’s surplus). This surplus indicates that, globally, the euro area is
saving and accumulating assets denominated in foreign currency.4 It also
means, that when monetary policy normalizes (and pressure to do so is building
up very quickly), if the current account surplus is not reduced, then the appreci-
ation of the euro will be unavoidable. That also means that assets accumulated
with a lower euro will lose value.
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As argued in the iAGS 2016 and as developed in chapter 4 of this report, the
appreciation of the euro (in effective terms) will amplify the centrifugal forces at
play inside the euro area. Brexit has created a precedent, giving some appeal to
the idea of a radical referendum in other countries, too. Conflicting interest
over monetary policy and re-debalancing of the current account, could well
open one or many other existential crises of the euro. What was experienced
with pain and awe during the summer of 2015 and the Grexit scenario could
well reproduce itself and finally the euro could break up. Joseph Stiglitz (2016)
is even adding some concerns by arguing that the uncertain adventure of split-
ting the euro area into smaller more homogeneous parts could be a better
solution than to keep it together the way it is. Let’s not be tempted by the
unknown of the exit, but rather, let’s heed Stiglitz’ warning that failing to
change the Union is no longer an option.
4. It is presently difficult to calculate what the exposure of the euro area to other currencies is.
Given the extent of the EA surplus, however, it is difficult to imagine that assets accumulated
could be in euro. That is marking a sharp change since 2007 when the euro area was nearly at
the current account equilibrium. Surplus countries were then accumulating assets inside the
euro area (on a consolidated basis), insuring themselves from exchange rate risks. The
counterpart may have been a larger risk of default, only partially materialized with the Greek
partial default (PSI in 2011-12) and the reduction in the net present value of the debt of
countries under the emergency financing of ESM/EFSF.
Figure 4. Euro area current account surplus
In % EA GDP
Source: OECD Economic Outlook 99, iAGS calculations.
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Figure 5 displays a panel of indicators summarizing the situation of the euro
area and comparable economies, hit as much, if not more, by the 2008 finan-
cial and banking crisis. Different choices have been made. On the one hand, the
euro area managed to stabilize its public debt more and has accumulated
external surpluses, saving more than investing. On the other hand, the United-
States and the United-Kingdom have been more pragmatic about public defi-
cits and debt, have thus attracted saving from surplus countries and recovered
quicker and sooner from the 2008 crisis. Of course, neither the US nor the UK
had to suffer from the euro debt crisis because their central banks, uncon-
strained by the institutional complexities of the euro area, took up their role
sooner and triggered non-conventional policies more effectively. One result is
that productive public and private investment is picking up, building the
grounds for future prosperity. We show in chapter 2 that, moreover, the idea
that the euro area is less prone to increasing inequality, and that would render
its economy less dynamic is a wrong one. Not only had the euro area less
growth, but inequality has been on the rise as well. Once again, one of the
drivers of inequality is growing inequality between member states, constituting
another centrifugal force to the Union.5
The data on Figure 6 shows a diverging situation inside the euro area. Diver-
gence between member states means that exposure to future shocks is going to
be different. It also suggests that market mechanisms and calls to structural
reforms are only a weak correction device. That argument is fully developed in
chapter 4 of this report and one important conclusion is that to ensure conver-
gence and current account rebalancing inside the euro area, decisive counter-
action by policymakers will be needed: just letting more flexible labor market
clearing mechanisms play will not deliver acceptable results. The adjustment of
current account imbalances we have seen largely reflects demand effects and as
such are not yet necessarily sustainable (chapter 4 of this report).
If an appreciation of the euro occurs and, correlated to if not caused by the
tapering of unconventional monetary policy, centrifugal forces will be amplified
even more. That should point to the urgency of solving the current crisis and
escaping as quickly as possible the stagnation trap in which the euro area
finds itself.
5. Prior to the crisis, as shown in chapter 2 of this report, inequalities between countries were
declining.
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What threatens the Union is not a Gordon type secular stagnation. May be
member states are better equipped to deal with inequalities and social invest-
ment than are more individualist societies like the US or the UK. But the Union
and the euro area could well die from their own poison, a self-inflicted secular
stagnation and an incapacity to build an economic future. 
Stiglitz’s dark prophecy has to be refuted.  
Figure 5. EA vs USA vs UK
Source: OECD Economic Outlook 99, iAGS 2017 calculations.
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A time of multiform uncertainty
Investment is not picking up despite abundant liquidity, low rates, and free risk
insurance from Juncker plan. Firms are holding cash (nearly half a year of value
added) as shown in Figure 7. Deleveraging has been realized and public debt is
stabilized and still confidence is not back. The continental wide paradox of thrift
is continuing.
Figure 6. Largest euro area countries
Source: OECD Economic Outlook 99, iAGS 2017 calculations.
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Decreasing interest rates are failing to stimulate investment because uncertainty
is multidimensional and not determined by financial considerations only or even
primarily. We can identify at least 5 sources of uncertainty: (1) a social crisis as
documented abundantly in chapter 2; (2) a political crisis with the rise of popu-
list and sovereign parties, closely linked to the social crisis, but also to the
apparent powerlessness of the current institutional set up to provide a way out
of the crisis. The migrant crisis ends up scapegoating foreigners while blaming
domestic elites; (3) a crisis of faith in the European construction, the extent of
which was demonstrated by Brexit, ranging from dissatisfaction with a poorly
functioning transnational democracy to the painful reopened discussion of the
right size of the euro area; (4) a macroeconomic question, the possibility of a so
called Summer secular stagnation, where the failure of coordination between
economic agents translates into deflation and sluggish potential; (5) 9 years
after the beginning of the banking and financial crisis, an on-going bank
problem and a nearly still born Banking Union that is not up to cleaning up the
balance sheet of banks and is preventing member states from doing so them-
selves (see chapter 3 in this report).
Such a multiform uncertainty would require a full political package. The answer
is not only economic: it has to be systemic.
Figure 7. Cash held by Non Financials Firms
Currency holdings and debt securities assets as a % of Gross Value Added
Source: ECB, Quarterly financial accounts.
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Fixing it: what to do?
The political side of the solution is in reinforcing the Union. After Brexit, rein-
forcement of the Union should also be a clear redefinition of the legitimacy of
the Union (the democratic component) and of the scope of the Union (what is
federal? what is not?). The report of the 5 presidents had started a debate. But
today, it seems everything is on hold. 
The inequality and social question remains mostly on the shoulders of national
governments. But dealing with social questions comes with fiscal needs, under
the scrutiny of the Union and the fiscal rules. So first, one need to redefine those
rules to allow for investing in future generations through public investment
including education. Second, a step forward in fair tax competition is essential
for the social cohesion of each member state and of the Union. Allowing for tax
justice and avoiding loopholes, aggressive tax optimization and tax evasion in
of the utmost importance when it comes to inequality.
The banking system’s troubles must be resolved. Either, this is the moment to
finish the Banking Union or redefine it to allow member states to intervene. The
appealing idea of disconnecting sovereign bond holders from sovereign bond
emitters may be unrealistic, but it is not a sufficient reason to let a zombie insti-
tution (the unborn Banking Union) not resolve zombie banks.
Internal imbalances need more than market mechanisms and structural reforms.
We have proposed a golden rule for wages in the iAGS 2014, and our subse-
quent analysis reinforces that insight. It is not straightforward to influence wage
and price formation in a market economy, but there are some direct instru-
ments (minimum wage norms, trade unions legislation, detached workers, fiscal
tools) that could be coordinated among member states to promote balanced
and thus more sustainable economic growth. In Chapter 4 we discuss broad-
ening the remit of the advisory Fiscal Council at European level and of national
productivity boards (which should be cast as advisory convergence councils),
for example by using the newly established National Productivity Boards. Imple-
mentation of an agreed and consistent policy stance would be facilitated by
substantially strengthening that the Macro Economic Dialogue (MED), intro-
ducing a MED at the level of the euro area, ensuring its interaction with the
Eurogroup, while ensuring articulation with member states by establishing
national MEDs. What is key is a policy mix that is appropriate in aggregate and
at the level of individual member states.
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The macroeconomic question should be dealt by an active demand manage-
ment. Backloading is possible now that member states have shown their
commitment to fiscal discipline. Now that all euro area countries have or will
soon reduce their public deficit under the 3 % ceiling, it is time to create fiscal
space instead of enforcing a new wave of fiscal consolidation with the aim to
bring down structural public deficits to 0.5% of GDP or the public debt ratios to
60%. Shifting from short term constraint to long term horizon creates fiscal
space where it is needed. A golden rule for public investment would allow the
fiscal targets to be reconsidered. When public investment is efficiently
managed, then, one can expect a positive impact on potential growth. As the
process of incorporating the Treaty on Stability Coordination and Governance
and other intergovernmental advances in response to the crisis is underway, it
would be wise to use that opportunity to incorporate those forward-looking
elements in the fiscal discipline rules.
Academics (Bom and Lightart (2014) for a recent survey) agree on an elasticity
around .1 between public capital stock and potential growth. That means that
a permanent increase in public investment by .1% per year, with a 20-year
lifespan of the investment (a higher life span multiplies the effect), would
increase in the long term public capital stock by 2% and long term output by
.2%/year. Our simulations in chapter 4 of this report show that, when this
effect is added to the plain Keynesian effect (short term multipliers) and to wise
backloading (higher fiscal multiplier when unemployment is high and monetary
policy is at the zero lower bound), when limiting the ex-post increase in debt to
1% (full public financing of the investment, front loaded immediately) gross
public assets can increase as much as 1.6% by 2035. A smart golden rule
cannot rule out a choice when net public assets are increased by such a large
margin.6
6. This effect depends a lot on the link between public investment and output. With an elasticity of
.1 between the stock of public productive capital (to be understood in a broad sense) and the
level of output, one gets 1.6% GDP of assets for 1% GDP debt so .6% GDP of net assets on
average for EA member states. Bom and Lightart retain a range from .08 to .17. With an
elasticity of 0.05, the increase in net assets in 2035 is nearly 0 on average in the EA and with an
elasticity of 0.15 the effect is about 2.6% GDP for gross public assets. The effect depends on the
country, because fiscal multipliers are larger in high unemployment gap countries. Thus, the
effect ranges from 4% GDP of gross public assets for Spain with a .15 capital to output elasticity
to a lowest for Germany (lower fiscal multiplier) 1.2% GDP of gross public assets with a capital
to output elasticity of 0.1. This shows the importance of management and allocation of public
investment as well as the consequences of back/frontloading.
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The last point to add to this full package is the environmental question. We
need an investment push to get out of the crisis and we need to invest in the
future without wasting money on inefficient public investment. As we argued in
the iAGS 2015, setting up a (or many) carbon price(s) would be one way to
open a large set of high yield investment projects. Private returns would be so
high that a boost in private investment would follow without the need for one
public euro. With an adequate regulatory framework, market forces could
ensure the correct allocation of money and answer to the needs of climate miti-
gation. The only drawback of a carbon price shock is that it will create many
losers, from exposed households to owners of “brown” capital. Border tax
adjustment could address the competitiveness question. Generous compensa-
tion scheme (including the receipts from the carbon prices, taxes, ETS) would
deliver a short-term boost, complement the stimulus and provide a tool to
ensure acceptance of climate mitigation.
 

